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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate to what extent foreign aid rents and natural resource rents can 
be compared with respect to their impact on economic growth. For this purpose, the direct impact of 
both economic rents on GDP growth, as well as their impact conditional on the quality of the 
institutional environment is assessed in cross-country and panel contexts. A natural resource curse is 
indeed identified in countries with poor institutional quality, however results regarding the impact of 
international aid rents are ambiguous. 
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1 Introduction 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) varies widely across countries. Actually, the highest GDP per capita 
value achieved by a country in 2010 is more than 500 times the lowest one.1 This huge gap poses 
serious concerns bearing in mind that GDP is often seen as the most representative measure of 
economic development. Particularly, GDP growth is linked to progress and prosperity, while its 
decline is connected to stagnation and poverty. The study of the roots of economic growth is 
therefore of utmost importance, and constitutes a classical area of research in economics.  
As a result of years of investigation, nowadays institutions are thought to play a crucial role in 
determining economic growth. They are believed to influence economic outcomes through the 
structuring of economic incentives in the society.2 Hence, several areas in economics are taking a 
political and institutional approach to economic growth. Among them, the natural resource curse and 
the aid effectiveness topics that are the focus of this study. 
With regards to natural resources, their discovery and exploitation has had perverse effects on the 
economic growth of several countries worldwide over the past decades. These effects were at first 
explained relying on an economic resource curse, i.e. the Dutch Disease.3 More recently, albeit not 
rejecting the Dutch Disease hypothesis, there has been a turn to a political resource curse that is in 
fact supported by evidence, being the two main findings in the literature that resource rich countries 
on average do tend to grow slower, but this undesired effect can nevertheless be overcome in a good 
institutional environment. 
The aid effectiveness literature, in turn, provides less homogeneous results. In fact, decades ago 
international aid programmes started to be carried out, without any convincing empirical or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The data on GDP per capita (expressed in current US$) has been retrieved from the World Bank (WB). The richest country in terms of 
GDP per capita in 2010 is Luxembourg and the poorest Burundi. 
2 See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) 
3 The Dutch Disease is a theory that associates negative repercussions to the non-resource sector (e.g. manufacturing) from a boom in the 
natural resources sector. It works as follows: a boom in the resource sector leads to the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which, in turn, 
causes a loss of competitiveness of the non-resource sector and its shrinkage. This does not simply reflect a shift of a country’s comparative 
advantage due to the fact that the Dutch Disease relies on the assumption that the resource sector lacks the learning-by-doing mechanism 
existent in the manufacturing sector, resulting no positive externalities therefrom. 
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theoretical foundation and still nowadays there is no compelling evidence of their growth enhancing 
potential or traceable benefits. 
Providing either more, or rather less sharp results, the existence of a vast literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of both economic rents is undeniable. Furthermore, there is an emergence of 
new studies comparing aid rents to natural resource rents. Notwithstanding the important differences 
between them, natural resource rents and foreign aid share in fact two crucial aspects; they are both 
fungible and have a windfall character, i.e. provide extra revenues to an economy. In this study it is 
hypothesized that whatever negative impact these extra revenues have, it is a result of the interaction 
between the rents and the local institutional arrangements. Specifically this analysis tries to answer 
two questions, in light of the evidence coming from the natural resource curse literature: what is the 
impact of aid on economic growth and whether this impact depends on the institutional 
environment. Multiple regression (MR), Fixed Effects (FE) regression, and Instrumental Variable 
(IV) regression models are the empirical methods used for this purpose. 
The MR approach, relying on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator, provided evidence of a 
negative impact of both windfalls on economic growth. When assessing to what extent institutional 
quality influences this result, the average impact of the rents remained negative, however the impact 
on economic growth of natural resource rents in the presence of good institutions is estimated as 
significantly positive, despite lacking robustness. Using country FE, most specifications show a 
significant positive impact of aid inflows in good institutional environments. The IV regression, in 
turn, reinforces the results obtained by the OLS estimator in the MR context. 
A theoretical model complements the empirical analysis motivating the importance of institutional 
quality, within a very simple framework that relies on centralized political economy models.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: section 2 comprises the literature review; 
section 3 and section 4 describe the empirical model and data sources, respectively; section 5 
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presents the results; section 6 develops the theoretical model; and section 7 concludes. 
2 Literature Review  
The emergence of a vast literature accounting for the fundamental role of institutions as a 
determinant of development, shaped economic theory and evidence, with institutions becoming one 
of the three main factors in explaining cross-country differences in economic performance, along 
with geography and culture (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005). Similarly, European 
colonization, which shaped the establishment of different types of economic institutions throughout 
the world, has become an object of study with verified implications for today’s patterns of 
development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002b). Ever since, several areas in 
economics have relied on institutional and political channels when approaching economic growth. 
2.1 The Natural Resource Curse 
One of the most counterintuitive concepts, and therefore a vastly analysed and debated topic in 
Development Economics, is the natural resource curse. Throughout the last decades, several theories 
were put forward in an attempt to shed some light on the dynamics that may be behind the 
underperformance exhibited by several resource rich economies. 
Early literature focused on an economic resource curse. From the Prebish-Singer hypothesis, 
concerning the disadvantage natural resource dependent countries would likely face given a context 
of deteriorating terms of trade, that dominated the 50’s and 60’s to the Dutch Disease that had by the 
80’s become the prevailing theory explaining the impact of natural resource richness on a country’s 
growth performance (Corden and Neary 1982). 
It was not until the 90’s though, that a worldwide comparative study confirmed the adverse effect of 
natural resource abundance on GDP growth. Sachs and Warner (1995) documented, based on a 
cross-country regression model, the adverse effect on GDP growth of a high ratio of natural resource 
exports to GDP in 1970, fact the authors explained relying on a Dutch Disease model. 
 6	  
Notwithstanding the fact that many resource rich economies have performed very poorly in terms of 
GDP growth, such as Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, it is undeniable that there are also success 
cases where the curse is not apparent (e.g. Norway, Botswana, Canada).4 The rationale behind these 
diverging experiences was uncovered by the recent institutional approach to the natural resource 
curse. In Robinson Torvik and Verdier (2006) and Caselli and Cunningham (2009) several channels 
that link natural resources to economic growth are analysed in political economy frameworks. 
Furthermore, following a rent-seeking approach both Boschini Pettersson and Roine (2007) and 
Mehlum Moene and Torvik (2006), provide compelling evidence on the fundamental role of 
institutions in determining the impact of resource rents on economic growth. The later resumes the 
state of the art in the literature, documenting the existence of a natural resource curse exclusively in 
countries with poor institutions.  
Nonetheless, despite the prevailing view supporting a natural resource curse in weak institutional 
environments, there is still extensive debate around fundamental aspects of the empirical and 
theoretical literature. As a matter of fact, concerns regarding the legitimacy of the commonly used 
measure of resource abundance, which can be in its essence interpreted as a proxy for resource 
dependency, are pointed out in Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) that argue that natural resources 
negatively affect growth only if they are excessively relied upon. Furthermore, in Brunnschweiler 
(2008) the author presents evidence of a natural resource blessing, rather than curse. In a different 
approach Gylfason and Zoega (2006) refuse institutions as the only channel through which natural 
resources affect growth, documenting the importance of two macroeconomics variables through 
which natural resources have a direct impact, investment and savings. 
Finally, more recent literature has tried to move beyond the regular cross-country evidence and has 
focused on microeconomic data regarding country specific experiences. In Vicente (2010), changes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For details on Botwana’s success refer to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002a). 
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in perceived corruption in Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde are compared following the oil 
discovery in the former, with the results supporting a political resource curse. In the same spirit, 
Caselli and Michaels (2009) investigate the impact of natural resources through the study of the 
variations in oil output among Brazilian municipalities, with the results fitting a model of patronage 
but specially consistent with theories accounting for the easy appropriation of oil resources. 
2.2 International Aid: Effectiveness and Allocation 
Having as many supporters as opponents, international aid transfers as a way of reducing poverty 
dates back to the World War II, inspired by the experience of the Marshall Plan. 
Without having so far proved irrefutable results of its benefits, foreign aid is often regarded as the 
problem rather than the solution. This pessimistic view found its roots in the 70’s due to works by 
Peter Bauer, who believed that aid would more likely be effective in countries that were not in need 
of it, the Bauer-paradox. More recently, Easterly (2003) is a strong proponent of this view. Aid 
optimists on the other hand believe aid inflows are crucial in overcoming major constraints to 
economic development. This view is expressed in Chenery and Strout (1966), and has been 
reviewed to include conditionality features, in light of the past decades experience. 
Recent literature regarding the effectiveness of international aid is based on two influential studies, 
which clearly expose both views. While in Boone (1996) it is documented that aid does not affect 
investment nor growth, neither does it promote development as measured by improvements in 
human development indicators, in Burnside and Dollar (2000), henceforth BD, the premise is that 
the impact of aid on growth is conditional on policy. Relying on OLS and 2SLS procedures, the later 
infer that even though on average aid has little impact on growth, the hypothesis that aid positively 
influences growth in the presence of growth promoting policies is confirmed and reported as robust. 
This second work in particular served as a catalyst in the aid literature, with several authors reacting 
to the result and conducting new research mainly to test its robustness. 
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In Collier and Dehn (2001), export price shocks were introduced in the analysis of the effectiveness 
of aid confirming the significance of BD’s results. In fact it is documented that aid is likely to be 
effective when directed to countries experiencing negative shocks. In Collier and Dollar (2002) the 
robustness of the results is also validated, through the use of a different measure of policies, and the 
extension of the period and countries under study.  
Nevertheless there are several studies in the literature that refuse these findings. Using the same 
econometric technique, specification and data, extended through 1993-97, in Eastely Levine and 
Roodman (2004), the interaction term between policies and aid ceases to be significant, jeopardizing 
the robustness of the result. Moreover, in Easterly (2003), the use of alternative definitions of aid, 
policies and growth, as well as different period averages, leads to statistical insignificance of the 
interaction term under study. Among others also the results documented in Hansen and Tarp (2001), 
as well as in Brumm (2003), do not support BD’s findings. 
Later on, in Burnside and Dollar (2004), the aid-growth relationship is revisited and reviewed. 
Rather than an index of macroeconomic growth-promoting policies, the interaction term is built 
using an index of institutional quality. The result is a robust positively significant interaction term, 
which is strongest in IV regression. 
Ambiguity around the relationship between aid and economic growth remains. A recent study 
describes well where the literature stands: in Rajan and Subramanian (2008), it is found little robust 
evidence of a positive and negative relation between the two, there is no evidence that aid works 
better in healthier policy environments, or that certain forms of aid work better than others. 
Behind these non-conclusive results regarding the relation between aid inflows and economic 
growth, there is little theoretical foundation. Still, some models can be found, suggesting 
explanations regarding the dynamics of foreign aid. In Boone (1996) the empirical analysis is based 
on a political economy model distinguishing among three kinds of regimes, with his findings fitting 
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the regime where the welfare of a fixed coalition is maximized through the transference of aid rents 
to a high-income political elite. A different explanation, which justifies the inefficiency of aid with its 
positive effect on rent seeking and corruption, is supported in Svensson (2000) and dismissed in 
Tavares (2003). Furthermore, following a different approach, in Rajan and Subramanian (2005), it is 
argued that aid may have negative long term effects through a Dutch Disease mechanism. 
Besides its effectiveness, another enduring topic in the field of international aid relates to its 
allocation. In an attempt to explain the pattern of bilateral aid, Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) 
present one of the first formal models of aid determinants and find that political and economic links 
to donor countries significantly help explaining aid allocation.  
While in early literature (McKinley  and Little 1979, Mosley 1981) allocation was estimated through 
two distinct equations, one accounting for the developmental concerns of the donor and the other for 
its strategic interests, nowadays studies rely on a model including both recipient characteristics as 
well as donor interest variables. Evidence is consensual and reports that the political and economic 
interests of donor countries outweigh the need and merits of the recipient. In Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) it is documented a tendency of major donors to care about historical factors in what concerns 
flows to ex-colonies, and also a strong link between UN voting patterns and aid commitments. It is 
worth noting though that this trend is changing, as reported in Dollar and Levin (2004), that found, 
mainly during the 90’s, a move towards aid selectivity in what concerns the recipient countries’ 
institutions and policies. 
2.3 Natural Resource Rents and Aid: What brings them together? 
As shown, there is a vast literature on the macroeconomic effects of natural resources and 
international aid. Moreover, a closer look at the literature allows recognizing a similar path, in what 
concerns both the empirical and theoretical approaches to the two topics. 
The current political resource curse approach builds on the assumption that the derived rents are 
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subject to discretionary distribution by the incumbent (Caselli and Cunningham 2009, Robinson, 
Torvik and Verdier 2006). In fact, this fungible character of natural resource rents is shared by 
foreign aid rents as documented in Feyzioglu Swaroop and Zhu (1998). To this extent, both rents 
represent fungible, extra revenues available to the incumbent. Despite their important differences, 
the characteristics these rents have in common may be the factors offsetting their potential growth 
enhancing effects. Even though they are expected to provide a “big-push", which is regarded as 
essential for economic progress, or relax capital constraints that are seen as a barrier to economic 
development, and therefore promote growth, so far this has not been confirmed by evidence. 
Actually, while in Collier (2006) aid is claimed to be on average considerably more effective in 
promoting development than oil, leading the author to encourage an aid scale up, which as he 
suggests could provide a big push, in Easterly (2006) this theory is strongly rejected. 
Ever since Collier first explicitly compared aid and natural resource rents, new studies have taken the 
same approach. Namely, the effect of both rents on corruption was comparatively studied in 
Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) that documents a positive impact of aid and a negative impact of 
natural resources on corruption, in line with Tavares (2003) and Vicente (2010). Moreover, in 
Morrison (2007) the author presents a model that aims at dealing with the fungibility of both rents by 
funnelling them to the citizens rather than to the governments. 
3 Empirical Model 
This empirical study attempts to answer two main questions: (1) To what extent is aid comparable to 
natural resources in terms of its impact on GDP growth?, and more importantly (2) Is the impact of 
aid on growth conditional on the local institutional arrangements? In other words it is hypothesized 
whether aid hinders growth and if this result applies to countries with sound institutions. In order to 
test this aid-institutions-growth relationship, different procedures are implemented in estimating 
departures from the following general equation: 
 11	  
!!" =   !!"!! +   !!"!! +   !"!"!!" +    !"!"!!" +   !!"!"!"!! +   !"!"!"!"!! +   !!"!! +   !!"
!     (1)  
where i indexes countries, t indexes time, !!" is the annual percentage growth of GDP per capita, !!" 
is the logarithm of initial GDP per capita, !!" is the percentage of aid receipts to GDP, !"!" is the 
percentage of natural resource rents to GDP, !"!" is a measure of institutional quality, and !!"
! is the 
error term. Both !!"!"!"  and !"!"!"!"  are interaction terms, the first between aid receipts and 
institutional quality and the later between natural resource rents and institutional quality. Finally, !!" 
is a vector of other exogenous variables that might affect growth, i.e. control variables; it consists of 
a measure of the level of investment to control for capital formation, a measure of openness of the 
economy, which is believed to have a positive impact on growth, and an ethnic tensions index as 
suggested by Easterly and Levine (1997).5  
While the logarithm of initial GDP per capita is included in order to capture convergence effects, the 
variables measuring natural resource rents and aid receipts as fractions of GDP are included to assess 
the impact of both on growth. Furthermore, institutional quality being one of the most important 
variables in this work is included not only to control for the institutional environment, which might 
affect growth, but also in the interaction terms allowing to infer upon the predicted conditionality. 
Variants of this equation have been estimated previously in the literature, specifically in Burnside 
and Dollar (2004), where the authors complement their earlier study by reviewing the interaction 
term used, to incorporate a institutional quality index. Its differentiating feature concerns the link 
made with the natural resource curse literature, through the inclusion of the terms !"!" and !"!"!"!". 
MR, FE and IV procedures are used to estimate equation (1). The first relies on the OLS estimator, 
which is used as a general technique for estimating linear regression models, however since the 
introduction in Boone (1996) of the use of instrumental variables, due to concerns about the possible 
endogeneity of aid inflows, IV regressions have become a standard procedure. This move towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The variables included in !!" are found in Sachs and Warner (1995), Burnside and Dollar (2000) or Mehlum Moene and Torvik (2006).  
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IV regression, which relies on the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator, created the need to 
estimate a new equation relating aid to variables known as instruments and the exogenous variables 
included in the equation of interest. The following equation is therefore regressed as a 1st stage in the 
referred procedure: 
!!" =   !!!! +   !!"!! +   !"!"!!" +    !"!"!!" +   !!"!! +   !!"!      (2)  
where !! is a vector of instrumental variables. The two instruments used in this study are the 
logarithm of population and the colonial links between donor and recipient countries. While the first 
was already used as an instrument in Boone (1996), the choice of the second was motivated by the 
literature concerning the allocation of aid that reports evidence of a trend of aid rents flowing from 
former colonizers to former colonies (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Dudley and Montmarquette 1976). 
Regarding the FE regression model, while time fixed effects are widely used in the aid literature, and 
are employed in this study in every specification for robustness, country fixed effects are seldom 
used to assess the impact of aid inflows on GDP growth.6 Nevertheless, this study implements this 
procedure given its unique feature of controlling for unobserved variables that are intrinsic to the 
countries and do not vary over time, hence minimizing omitted variable bias. 
Furthermore, it is a common practice to divide the time frame into sub-periods.7 This is done for 
mainly three reasons: it increases the size of the sample; it is useful to explore the time dimension in 
the data; and it eliminates business cycle factors and measurement error. In this study the 22-years 
time frame is divided into four sub-periods, of 5 years each with the exception of the last period 
which averages the last 7 years under analysis, from 2000 to 2006.8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Time fixed effects were used in Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004),Collier and Dehn (2001), Easterly Levine and Roodman 
(2004) among others. Country fixed effects were used in Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
7 While Burnside and Dollar (2000) use 4-year periods, Boone (1996) uses both 5-year and decade averaged data and Easterly (2003) uses 
8, 12 and 24 year periods. 
8 Initial GDP per capita is not averaged, it is measured at the beginning of the period. 
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4 Data: Main Variables Description and Sources9 
The dependent variable in equation (1) is the WB series entitled GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
and defined as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. 
Aid is measured as the net disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA) available 
from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC-OECD).10 It is expressed in current US$ and 
defined as flows that are concessional in character and convey a grant element of at least 25%. For 
the purpose of this work it is divided by the WB series GDP (current US$). 
Following Sachs and Warner (1995), the WB series total resource rents to GDP, defined as the sum 
of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and forest rents, is used as the measure of natural resources. 
Regarding institutional quality, two different measures are used to capture this variable throughout 
the empirical analysis, being both based on data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG-
PRS), the most widely used source of information on institutions in the literature.11 The first, used as 
the prime measure of institutional quality in this study, consists of an unweighted average of four 
indices: Law and Order, Investment Profile, Bureaucratic Quality and Corruption.12 The resulting 
index is believed to capture the essence of the degree of property rights protection and rule of law 
prevalence. The second measure is used in order to test for robustness and consists solely of the Law 
and Order index.13 The institutional quality variable, which is not provided for several developing 
countries, is the major source of constraint in terms of data availability. 
5 Empirical Results 
The evidence presented in this section results from the estimation of the equations described above 
using a panel of 88 countries with data across four five-years periods from 1985 to 2006.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The description and source of all variables in this study is available in the Appendix Table A.1. 
10 ODA is used to measure aid also in Boone (1996), Easterly (2003), Burnside and Dollar (2004). 
11ICRG-PRS constitutes the source of information regarding institutional quality in Sachs and Warner (1995), Burnside and Dollar (2000, 
2004), Easterly Ross and Levine (2004), Tavares (2003), Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006), among others. 
12 The index is based on the analysis of Knack and Keefer (1995). 
13 Approach followed in Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006). 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
  Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth (% annual) 1,42 1,92 -4,28 8,79 
GDP per capita (current US$) 3318,09 5462,37 169,47 30627,82 
Natural Resource Rents (%GDP) 0,12 0,15 0,00 0,68 
Foreign Aid (%GDP) 0,06 0,08 0,00 0,42 
Institutional Quality Index 3,49 0,78 1,37 5,63 
Investments (%GDP) 0,21 0,06 0,09 0,39 
Openness (%GDP) 0,73 0,44 0,20 3,50 
Ethnic Tensions Index 0,61 0,22 0,09 1,00 
Note: The Institutional Quality Index varies from 0 to 6. The Ethnic Tensions Index varies from 0 to 1. 
 
 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables across the 22-year timeframe are reported in Table 1. 
Concerning the economic rents, the average percentage of natural resource rents to GDP is two 
times the average percentage of foreign aid rents to GDP. Moreover, dependence on natural 
resource rents appears greater than dependence on foreign aid rents as suggested by the maximum 
value of the two. 
5.1 Multiple Regression Model 
To start with, equation (1) is regressed excluding the interaction terms. The results are presented in 
Appendix Table A.2 and provide evidence of a significant negative impact of natural resources and 
foreign aid on GDP per capita growth, robust to the inclusion of controls and to some extent to the 
use of the second measure of institutional quality. 
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS estimation of equation (1) including the interaction terms. 
Albeit the lack of robustness to a different measure of institutional quality in column (5), and the 
statistical insignificance of the interaction term involving aid receipts, results are in line with the 
hypothesis previously described; both economic rents present negative coefficients while both 
interaction terms present positives coefficients.  
Even though it is useful to start with an OLS regression in order to understand the patterns in the 
data, no major conclusions should be taken from this first method. The consistency of its results 
depends on key assumptions that do not hold in case of endogeneity or omitted variables, two real 
threats in this study. In fact, performing an Omitted Variable Test, results in the rejection, at a 1% 
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significance level, of the hypothesis that there exists no omitted variable.  
Table 2 – Multiple Regression Model 
Estimation Method OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial GDP pc -0.547 -0.425* -0.377* -0.400* -0.204 
 
(0.368) (0.218) (0.227) (0.242) (0.222) 
Natural Resources -0.633 10.47*** -9.923** -9.749** -8.767** 
 
(8.587) (3.893) (3.919) (3.926) (4.371) 
Aid -6.766 -5.317** -5.219** -5.128** -3.608 
 
(12.49) (2.073) (2.090) (2.110) (2.505) 
NR* IQ 0.0150 0.138** 0.132** 0.130** 0.103 
 
(0.120) (0.0588) (0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0713) 
Aid*IQ 6.117 2.910 3.996 3.499 1.545 
 
(17.37) (6.804) (7.019) (7.259) (8.230) 
IQ 2.778** 1.274** 1.309** 1.307** 2.233 
 
(1.178) (0.595) (0.604) (0.606) (1.441) 
Investments 
 
18.13*** 18.72*** 18.63*** 19.09*** 
  
(2.725) (2.848) (2.866) (3.079) 
Openness 
  
-0.343 -0.328 -0.306 
   
(0.428) (0.427) (0.406) 
Ethnic Tensions 
   
0.0408 -0.00381 
    
(0.131) (0.133) 
R-squared 0.114 0.311 0.313 0.313 0.300 
Observations 326 313 313 313 313 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth. IQ stands for Institutional Quality. Variables are described 
in more detail in the text. In regressions (1) , (2) , (3) and (4), the IQ variable is the contructed IQ Index. In 
regression (5) the IQ variable corresponds to a Law and Order Index. All regressions include time dummies and a 
constant, which coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Full sample. *significant at 
10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
 
 
5.2 Fixed Effects Regression Model 
A way of controlling for omitted variables is the use of FE regression, the main tool of regression 
analysis of panel data. As described data have been divided into sub-periods resulting in four 
observations per country, however to maximize the advantages of this method the whole panel data 
including every year from 1985 to 2006 is also used in estimating equation (1).  
The FE regression estimates in Table 3 show interesting results in what concerns the impact of aid 
rents on GDP growth. Both the averaged data (AVD) and the full panel data (PD) provide evidence 
of a positive impact of aid rents on growth when coupled with good institutions, at 1% level of 
significance and robust across all specifications. Moreover, while the AVD does not show a direct 
significant impact of aid on GDP growth, this impact is negative with a 5% significance level in the 
PD. The use of the second measure of IQ across all specifications does not significantly alter the 
results, therefore these estimates are not reported. 
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Table 3 – Fixed Effects Regression 
  (6)    (7)    (8)    (9) 
 
AVD PD AVD PD AVD PD AVD PD 
Initial GDP pc -0.570 
 
0.965 
 
0.960 
 
0.960 
 
 
(1.978) 
 
(0.704) 
 
(0.714) 
 
(0.716) 
 NR -28.22 -9.202 2.187 0.970 2.500 0.791 2.647 0.484 
 
(22.53) (6.278) (7.506) (5.164) (7.664) (5.356) (8.150) (5.492) 
Aid -2.002 -14.99*** -6.833 -9.223** -6.828 -9.156** -6.761 -9.393** 
 
(17.89) (5.524) (5.450) (4.599) (5.447) (4.636) (5.548) (4.668) 
NR*IQ 0.416* 2.281 0.143 1.488 0.141 1.562 0.139 1.656 
 
(0.250) (1.562) (0.129) (1.463) (0.129) (1.468) (0.136) (1.504) 
Aid*IQ 36.88 6.969*** 37.95*** 5.477*** 38.45*** 5.437*** 38.37*** 5.495*** 
 
(22.63) (1.840) (12.40) (1.650) (12.68) (1.651) (12.72) (1.664) 
IQ 1.985** 2.291 1.109* 0.288 1.100* 0.298 1.089* 0.568 
 
(0.928) (2.183) (0.624) (1.726) (0.620) (1.724) (0.614) (1.620) 
Investments 
  
16.30*** 17.55*** 16.64*** 17.61*** 16.64*** 17.57*** 
   
(3.807) (2.641) (3.921) (2.837) (3.928) (2.853) 
Openness 
    
-0.383 0.0865 -0.387 0.0929 
     
(1.457) (1.013) (1.482) (1.014) 
Ethnic Tensions 
      
0.0255 -0.108 
       
(0.259) (0.198) 
R-squared 0.150 0.091 0.308 0.130 0.308 0.131 0.308 0.131 
N countries 87 88 84 85 84 85 84 85 
Note: AVD stands for Averaged Data. PD Stands for Full Panel Data. The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth. IQ stands for 
Institutional Quality. Variables are described in more detail in the text.  All regressions include time dummies and a constant, which coefficients 
are not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Full sample. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
5.3 Instrumental Variable Regression Model 
The use of IV regression is the most standard approach in the aid literature to overcome the 
problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias not addressed by OLS. It involves the use of 
instruments, which ideally capture the movements in the aid variable that are uncorrelated to the 
error term in equation (1), allowing for a consistent estimation of its coefficients. A 2SLS estimation 
strategy fitting equations (1) and (2) is used for this purpose. 
Table 4 presents the IV regression results. Before proceeding to the analysis of the relationship of 
interest present in the 2nd stage regression results, there is the need to confirm the validity of the 
instruments, given that unless the two conditions for a valid instrument are fulfilled the resulting 
estimates are meaningless. The relevance of the instrumental variables is confirmed through the 
performance of a F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the coefficients of the instruments in the 1st 
stage regression are zero, which provides a result well above 10, the standard rule of thumb 
approach.  
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Table 4 – Instrumental Variables Regression  
Estimation Method 2SLS 
 
(10) (11) (12) (13) 
Initial GDP pc -0.750*** -0.748** -0.808** -0.542* 
 
(0.266) (0.298) (0.333) (0.307) 
Natural Resources -10.53*** -10.52*** -10.23*** -10.18** 
 
(3.937) (3.942) (3.935) (4.399) 
Aid -11.46*** -11.46*** -11.21*** -11.70** 
 
(3.726) (3.806) (3.759) (4.721) 
NR*IQ 0.142** 0.142** 0.139** 0.130* 
 
(0.0599) (0.0605) (0.0604) (0.0725) 
Aid*IQ 3.053 3.124 1.462 5.862 
 
(9.506) (9.953) (10.53) (13.26) 
IQ 1.383** 1.382** 1.386** 1.445 
 
(0.619) (0.623) (0.627) (1.589) 
Investments 18.18*** 18.19*** 17.98*** 18.83*** 
 
(2.781) (3.002) (3.043) (3.333) 
Openness 
 
-0.00342 0.0386 0.0551 
  
(0.451) (0.456) (0.446) 
Ethnic Tensions 
  
0.0835 0.0450 
   
(0.138) (0.137) 
R-squared 0.292 0.292 0.292 0.279 
Observations 313 313 313 313 
 
1st Stage 
 
(14) (15) (16) (17) 
Initial GDP pc -0.294*** -0.294*** -0.295*** -0.301*** 
 
(0.0477) (0.0478) (0.0475) (0.0482) 
Initial GDP pc ^2 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0168*** 
 
(0.00313) (0.00314) (0.00312) (0.00318) 
Population -0.0264*** -0.0263*** -0.0262*** -0.0257*** 
 
(0.00284) (0.00347) (0.00356) (0.00343) 
Colonies -0.0340*** -0.0341*** -0.0336*** -0.0314*** 
 
(0.00861) (0.00812) (0.00871) (0.00820) 
Natural Resources -0.0496*** -0.0498*** -0.0487*** -0.0516*** 
 
(0.0187) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0181) 
IQ 0.00645 0.00640 0.00599 -0.0158 
 
(0.00833) (0.00833) (0.00807) (0.0215) 
Investmets 0.136** 0.135* 0.134 0.143* 
 
(0.0665) (0.0803) (0.0811) (0.0830) 
Openness 
 
0.000654 0.000791 0.00236 
  
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0102) 
Ethnic Tensions 
  
0.000767 0.00195 
   
(0.00234) (0.00228) 
R-squared 0.679 0.679 0.679 0.679 
Observations 317 317 317 317 
Relevance of the instruments test 
F ( 2, . ) 43.78 28.95 27.01 28.30 
Overidentification test 
!!(1) 2.51809  2.72585  2.01601  2.33746   
   (p = 0.1125)  (p = 0.0987)  (p = 0.1556) (p = 0.1263) 
Notes: The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth in columns (10), (11), (12) ,(13), and Aid in columns (14), 
(15), (16) and (17). IQ stands for Institutional Quality. Variables are described in more detail in the text. The 
variables Colonies and Population are used as instruments. In columns (13) and (17) the  measure of IQ is the Law 
and Order index.  All regressions include time dummies and a constant, which coefficients are not reported. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Full sample. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
Furthermore, given that this study relies on two instruments and there is only one endogenous 
regressor, it is possible to perform an overidentification test and assess whether the instruments are 
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exogenous. As reported there is a non-rejection of the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous at 5% significance level, which fulfils the remaining condition confirming the validity of 
the instruments.  
Focusing on the results from the 2nd stage regression, there is evidence of a natural resource curse as 
documented in Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006), robust to the inclusion of all controls and the 
use of the second measure of institutional quality. Furthermore, the interaction term involving aid 
has a positive coefficient as in Burnside and Dollar (2004) but it is not significant as in Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008). The unconditional impact of aid rents is negative, significant and robust. The 
growth deterrent character of aid rents has been documented previously though as non-robust 
(Brumm 2003, Easterly 2003, Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004, Rajan and Subramanian 2008). 
Contrary to what is documented in Collier (2006) this study is not able to robustly qualify aid rents 
as superior to natural resource rents, nor to provide compelling evidence of a growth enhancing 
potential of aid conditional on institutional quality as suggested in Burnside and Dollar (2004). 
6 Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model hereby developed attempts to predict the impact of international aid and 
natural resource rents on growth through an institutional channel, and is adapted from the workhorse 
model in Besley and Persson (2010). It is a centralized political economy model, which along with 
the rent seeking approach and the Dutch Disease models are representative of the main theories in 
the aid effectiveness and natural resource literature.14 
This model relies on the assumption that aid rents, as well as natural resource rents accrue entirely to 
the political elite and are thus subject to the leader’s discretionary behaviour.15 The leader’s budget 
consists therefore of both aid and natural resource rents, which will be collectively referred to as 
windfalls, denoted by W and normalized to one.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This model is characterized as a centralized political economy model due to its focus on the incentives and constraints faced by a political 
elite. Decentralized models, i.e. rente seeking, focus on the incentives faced by private individuals. 
15 Aid and resource rents are assumed to accrue to the incumbente in Morrison (2007) and in Dalgaard and Olsson (2008). 
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The economy is characterized by a non-booming, yet productive, tradable sector. Formally, the 
tradable sector GDP depends on the share of W invested in the economy (!), according to the 
following production function  
! ! = !!/!.  (3) 
that is increasing in the share ! but characterized by diminishing returns (!! > 0; !!! < 0).  
As in all political economy models, there is state intervention that in this case is modelled as a 
decision making process by a political elite, represented by a pro-active, self-interested utility 
maximizing individual, henceforth the leader. The leader’s decision entails allocating W across his 
own consumption of politically valuable goods, which can be thought of as distributions across the 
elite that are unproductive from an economic point of view, or to investments in the economy. 
However the freedom the leader enjoys in allocating W across the two ends is constrained by an 
exogenous variable ! that captures the quality of the local institutional environment and assumes 
values from 0 to 1, i.e. !   ∈    0,1 , with high values indicating high institutional quality. For 
simplicity the computations rely on the use of the parameter ! = (1− !), that varies inversely to 
! though also between 0 and 1. All in all, the leader maximizes the following utility function  
!! = 1 − !   ! + !"(!)  (4) 
where ! is an exogenous tax rate. Hence, the share the leader directs to his own consumption of 
politically valuable goods, (1− !), enters his utility function directly, while the share devoted to 
investments in the economy enters through the taxation levied on the productive tradable sector. The 
leader cannot capture the entire tradable sector GDP due to the distortionary effects of taxation.  
The focus should lie on the parameter !, that enters the utility function creating a mechanism that 
refrains the leader from appropriating W for consumption scaling downwards the derived utility in 
accordance to the quality of the institutional environment. If institutional quality is very high, the 
incentive to appropriate W is minimized. This mechanism can be though of as representing the 
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higher enforcement of rule of law and protection of property rights in better institutional 
environments that leave less room for the leader to not honour his commitments with the aid 
agencies, or the closer link between citizens and government in better institutional environments that 
promote transparency and government accountability. On the other hand if the institutional quality is 
very poor, it does not play a significant role in influencing the allocation of W. 
Plugging equation (3) into equation (4) and taking the first order condition (FOC) with respect to the 
variable of choice, !, yields 
!
!!!/!
= !   ! = !
!
!
!
!
  (5) 
which shows the allocation of aid rents and natural resource rents to investments in the economy 
depends positively on the tax rate and institutional quality. Given that ! is exogenous the focus is on 
the parameter !, whose interpretation is summarized in Proposition 1. 
 Proposition 1. The higher the institutional quality, the higher is the share of aid and natural 
resource rents allocated to investments in the economy. 
Finally an adaptation of the Solow model relates the allocation decision made by the leader and 
GDP growth. Assuming the share ! of the aid and natural resource rents allocated to investments in 
the economy has an impact on long-term growth through the accumulation of capital, the dynamics 
between the windfall and GDP growth can be derived. Starting with a standard production function 
! = !"!!!!!     
!"#$"%!&$  !"#$
    ! = !!!  (6) 
where A represents technology, the parameter ! is the share of capital in income, ! = ! ! and 
! = ! !. And relying on the following capital accumulation equation 
! = ! − !"  (7) 
where ! refers to the depreciation rate and ! corresponds to investment and therefore to the share ! 
of the windfall allocated to the tradable sector, the relevant equation becomes 
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! = !" − !"    
!"#$"%!&$  !"#$
    ! = !"
!
− ! + ! !  (8) 
with ! being population growth rate, and from where it is possible to derive the following conditions 
!" ! < ! + ! !    ! < 0; !" ! > ! + ! !    ! > 0; !" ! = ! + ! !    ! = 0. 
The implications coming from the above conditions lead to the following proposition 
 Proposition 2. There is capital accumulation only if the magnitude of the investment in the 
economy exceeds the depreciation rate of capital coupled with the growth rate of the population. 
Furthermore GDP growth can be written relying on equations (6) and (8) as  
!! =
!
!
= !
!
!
+
!
!
= !
!"
!
− ! + ! +
!
!
 
and given the fact that both rents have been considered in the empirical model as shares of GDP it is 
more consistent to write the above equation as  
!! = !
!"
!
!
!
− ! + ! +
!
!
 
and derive the FOC w.r.t. the share of aid and natural resource rents to GDP 
!!!
! !"!
= !"
!
!
 
whose intuitive result is expressed in Proposition 3. 
 Proposition 3. The impact of aid and natural resources on economic growth if fundamentally 
positive and depends on the share allocated to investments in the economy.  
This model therefore uncovers the growth enhancing potential of both economic rents that is offset 
by poor institutions that do not enforce the allocation of a share of the revenues high enough to 
overcome the depreciation rate of capital and the growth rate of the population allowing for capital 
accumulation and long-term growth. 
7 Conclusion 
In this study aid effectiveness was analysed in light of the documented results on the impact of 
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natural resource rents on GDP growth. The aim was to assess to what extent both revenues are 
comparable. To this end two questions were addressed, namely what is the impact of aid on GDP 
growth and if this impact is linked with the local institutional environment. 
Using the standard measures of aid, natural resources, institutional quality and growth, and relying 
on controls previously used in the literature, the results were not encouraging with respect to foreign 
aid inflows. While the results regarding the impact of natural resource rents were consistent with 
previous literature, reinforcing the acknowledged conditionality on institutions, aid inflows’ positive 
impact on growth in a good institutional environment was left to prove given the lack of robustness 
of the results. 
Once again the aid-growth relationship has been revisited, both in cross-country and panel contexts, 
without providing any conclusive results. Further research should aim at going beyond cross-country 
analysis, and uncover what lies behind the impact of aid on economic growth. Analysing through 
what channels aid may be either promoting or hindering growth and understanding the different 
successful or rather unsuccessful experiences is imperative in order to promote aid effectiveness. 
Also, to bear in mind that every case is unique is very important in a developing world that 
comprises such a vast and dissimilar amount of countries. 
Aid by itself appears to lack the capability of financing growth; therefore the lasting focus on the 
magnitude of the transfers should not distract aid agencies from their primary objective of reaching 
the most in need and provide means for the improvement of life standards. Careful evaluation of on-
going and complete projects, as well as population involvement can only benefit both sides of the 
donor-recipient relationship and should consist of a standard procedure.  
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Appendices 
Table A.1 – Data Description and Sources  
Variable Description Source 
GDP per capita  growth Annual growth rate of GDP per capita WB 
Initial GDP per capita Logarithm of GDP per capita (current US$) measured at the beginning of each period WB 
Natural Resource Rents Total natural resource rents as % GDP WB 
Foreign Aid Net disembursementsof ODA (current US$) as % GDP DAC-OECD; WB 
Intitutional Quality Index Unweighted average of the indices: Law and Order, Corruption, Investment Profile and Bureaucratic Quality ICRG-PRS 
Investments Gross capital formation as %GDP WB 
Openness Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as %GDP WB 
Ethnic Tensions Ethnic Tensions Index ICRG-PRS 
Colonies Dummy variable equal to one if the country is a former colony of France, UK or Belgium  CIA 
Population Logarithm of total population WB 
Note:	  WB	   refers	   to	   the	  World	  Bank	  Data	  Catalog.	  DAC-­‐OECD,	   in	   turn,	   refers	   to	   the	  Development	  Assistance	  Committee	   of	   the	  Organization	   for	   the	  
Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development.	  The	  ICRG-­‐PRS	  is	  the	  International	  Country	  Risk	  Guide	  from	  the	  Political	  Risk	  Services	  Group.	  Finally	  the	  CIA	  
is	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  World	  Fact	  Book.	  
 
 
Table A.2 – Multiple Regression Model  
Estimation Method OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial GDP per capita -0.369* -0.206 -0.323 -0.372* -0.153 
 
(0.204) (0.166) (0.209) (0.214) (0.191) 
Natural Resources -3.280** -3.568** -3.024* -2.873* -3.336** 
 
(1.613) (1.526) (1.602) (1.592) (1.504) 
Aid -4.217** -3.272* -3.664* -3.841* -2.683 
 
(1.976) (1.966) (2.084) (2.076) (2.096) 
Institutional Quality 1.595*** 3.217*** 1.643*** 1.609*** 3.340*** 
 
(0.542) (0.934) (0.554) (0.557) (0.972) 
Investments 17.60*** 17.99*** 18.31*** 18.15*** 18.72*** 
 
(2.724) (2.774) (2.870) (2.869) (2.919) 
Openness 
  
-0.415 -0.386 -0.410 
   
(0.416) (0.412) (0.388) 
Ethnic Tensions 
   
0.0963 -0.00782 
    
(0.126) (0.131) 
R-squared 0.292 0.297 0.299 0.300 0.294 
Observations 313 313 313 313 313 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth. IQ stands for Institutional Quality. Variables are 
described in more detail in the text. In regressions (2) and (5) the IQ variable corresponds to the Law and 
Order Index. Further details on the IQ variables are presented in the text. All regressions include time 
dummies and a constant, which coefficients are not reported. Robust standard erros in parentheses. Full 
sample. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
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